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ABSTRACT

A marked feature of contemporary US constitutional landscape is the campaign by an
Evangelical-Catholic coalition against the idea of “secularism,” understood by this alliance to
mean the exclusion of religion from the state and its progressive marginalization from social life.
Departing from the tendency to treat this project as a national phenomenon, this article places it
within a longer global genealogy of an earlier international Christian ecumenical effort to combat
“secularism.” The triumph of that campaign culminated in the making of Article 18 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, now considered the paradigmatic international legal
provision on religious liberty. Article 18’s protection of the rights to proselytize and convert, I
argue, was a product of an impassioned contestation between an ecumenical movement keen on
securing the prerogative to spread the gospel to the “non-Christian world” and a “secularism” in
a strange alliance with Islam in the region that held the greatest promise for the evangelical
enterprise—Muslim Africa. In excavating the genealogy of ecumenical thought as it developed a
critique of the “secularist threat,” this article recovers the delicate links between the
contemporary US anti-secular campaign and the earlier ecumenical project.
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Introduction
Religious liberty was a cornerstone of the U.S. Justice Department’s agenda under the Trump
administration. Perhaps the most well-known articulation of this project is former Attorney
General William Barr’s 2019 address at the University of Notre Dame.1 Barr set out the crusade
in stark terms in this widely assailed speech: religion is in an existential war with “militant
secularism.”2 This secularist enemy, Barr proclaimed, was the “doctrine of moral relativism.”
Unleashed on society, moral relativism is not content with personal disenchantment; in Barr’s
understanding, it, instead, seeks to deprive the entire society of religion’s “moral discipline.”3
Secularism is, therefore, not the absence of religion; it is, instead, a form of “orthodoxy,” a
“false” paganistic faith.4 For all the outrage that greeted Barr’s speech, the Attorney General’s
critique of secularism is certain to survive the departure of the Trump administration, not least
because it resonates in sections of the academy. Take two prominent examples: Professor Steven
Smith and Professor Adrian Vermeule, have argued, like Barr, that secularism is a false religion
on a mission to marginalize ‘true’ religion.5 In the Barrian narrative, the siege on faith has

1

Attorney General William P. Barr, Remarks at the University of Notre Dame to the Law School and the de Nicola
Center for Ethics and Culture (Oct. 11, 2019).
2
Id. See Katherine Stewart & Caroline Frederickson, Bill Barr Thinks America in Going to Hell, New York Times
(Dec. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/29/opinion/william-barr-trump.html
3
Id.
4
Notes Barr, “the secular project has itself become a religion, pursued with religious fervor. It is taking on all the
trappings of a religion, including inquisitions and excommunication. Those who defy the creed risk a figurative
burning at the stake…” Id.
5
See STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE WARS FROM THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC
(2018); Adrian Vermeule, Liturgy of liberalism, 269 FIRST THINGS 57 (2017); see also RUSSELL R. RENO,
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culminated in the gradual secularization of society, notably regarding the family, sex, and
schools. The result, as Barr declared, has been “moral chaos … immense suffering, wreckage,
and misery.”6 Crucially, however, for Barr, secularism’s wins are not merely cultural victories
but are devastating attacks “against religion on the legal plane” carried out through a
separationist notion of the Establishment Clause. It is, therefore, in law that the secularist enemy
becomes a more lethal foe: church-state separation. As the legal expression of the secularist
agenda to eliminate religion from society, separationism, argued the Attorney General, seeks to
“drive religious viewpoints” from the “public square” and consequently, “impinge on free
exercise.” If the secularist project described by Barr is being executed by organizations such as
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, its philosophical blueprint was laid out
in John Rawls’ well-known works on liberal secularism.7 The task, Barr declared, is to “resist”
this “secularization” project by championing religious liberty.
This resistance is achieving outstanding success. Today, a marked feature of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence is “Religious Antiliberalism”—the broadening of free exercise of religion
jurisprudence and the simultaneous “narrowing” of establishment jurisprudence.8 A survey of the

RESURRECTING THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY (2016); Rex Ahdar, Is Secularism Neutral, 26 RATIO JURIS 404
(2013);. For a critique of Smith, see Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Jews, Not Pagans, 56 SAN DIEGO
LAW REVIEW 497 (2019). For an analysis of the critique mounted by conservative legal elites on secularism, see
Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Religious Antiliberalism and the First Amendment, 104 MINNESOTA
LAW 1341 (2019). For a critique from the left, see POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan,
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Saba Mahmood & Peter G. Danchin, eds., 2015).
6
Barr supra, note 1.
7
See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)
8
See Schragger & Schwartzman supra, note 5; Brendan Beery, Prophylactic Free Exercise: The First Amendment
and Religion in a Post-Kennedy World, 82 ALBANY LAW REVIEW 121 (2018); Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel,
Conscience Wars in Transnational Perspective: Religious Liberty, Third-Party Harm, And Pluralism, in THE
CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY 16 (Susanna
Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2018). On the Establishment side, consider, for instance, Espinoza v. Montana
Department of Revenue 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (declaring unconstitutional a religious rule disqualifying religious
schools from accessing public funding granted to similarly situated secular private schools); and Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, (2014) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to town’s practice of beginning meetings
with sectarian and mainly Christian prayers). On the free exercise side, see for example, Little Sisters of the Poor
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court’s jurisprudence in the last decade reveals the outstanding success of parties making
religious liberty claims.9 Many emphasize that this triumph of religious liberty is not a win for all
religions; it is the victory of “the dominant religious tradition.”10 Richard Schragger and Micah
Schwartzman refer to this trend in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence as “Christian
Preferentialism,” comparing the favor with which the recent court has received Christian free
exercise claims to its attitude to religious minorities.11 This direction of Supreme Court
jurisprudence, complemented by the executive branch’s religious freedom agenda, has led

Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania et al. 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020) (holding it unconstitutional to mandate
religious orders to provide contraceptive coverage contrary to their religious beliefs) and Masterpiece Cakeshop v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (holding that Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s
actions in assessing a baker’s religiously motivated reasons for refusing to bake a cake for a same-sex wedding had
violated the Free Exercise Clause). In those cases that have involved a “play in the joints” notably, the ministerial
exemption cases, the Court has construed separation as “noninterference” in the internal governance of religious
organizations, consequently, upholding religious liberty. See most recently, Our Lady of Guadalupe v. MorrisseyBerru 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020) (extending the scope of “ministerial exception” to antidiscrimination laws (therefore
further expanding the employer immunity from employment anti-discrimination laws first laid down in HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 565 U.S 171 (2012).
9
See Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
supra note 8; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 US 682 (2014); Town of Greece v. Galloway, supra note 8; Holt
v. Hobbs, 574 US 352 (2015); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 135 S.
Ct. 2028 (2015); Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018);
Sause v. Bauer, 585 US _ (2018); American Legion v. American Humanist Association 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019);
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, supra note 8; Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru,
supra note 8; Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, supra note 8; St. James School
v. Biel (2020). Tanzin v. Tanvir 19-71 SC (2020). Only in two cases did the religious side lose: Trump v. Hawaii
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (upholding the Presidential Proclamation of the Muslim ban), and Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct.
661 (2019) (dismissing a challenge to Alabama’s refusal to permit an Islamic clergy in the execution of a Muslim
prisoner in place of the Christian chaplain usually present.)
10
Stephen M. Feldman, Principle, History, and Power: The Limits of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 81
IOWA LAW REVIEW 833, 854-55 (1996) (“For most of the last two millennia, Christians have maintained a position
of hegemonic domination in Western society...”).
11
Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 5 at 1347. Schragger and Schwartzman cite the decision in Trump v.
Hawaii and Dunn v. Ray as examples of this attitude to minorities. See further Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry P.
McDonald, Eviscerating a Healthy Church-State Separation, 96 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1009
(2018); Beery, supra note 8; Aaron E. Schwartz, Dusting off the Blaine Amendment: Two Challenges to Missouri's
Anti-Establishment Tradition, 73 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW 129 (2008). This is not to deny that the Supreme Court has
extended religious freedom protections to religious minority groups in some cases, including most recently in
Tanzin v. Tanvir (holding that federal agents can be sued for damages in their individual capacity for violating
religious liberties of the Muslim petitioners as guaranteed by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act) Tanvir 19-71
SC (2020). However, the overall tenor of the Court’s jurisprudence is to privilege the predominant religious
tradition. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 5 at 1402.
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another author to announce the onset of “an age of prophylactic free exercise,” one in which
Christian religious freedom ranks higher than church-state separation.12
This article situates U.S. “Religious Antiliberalism” within a longer genealogy–that of
the global mission to marginalize secularism and advance Christian religious liberty that
culminated in the making of the human right to religious liberty in the aftermath of the Second
World War. The actors in that story are familiar: a powerful Protestant coalition–ecumenical and
international, yet featuring prominent U.S. Evangelicals–successfully crafted a Christian notion
of religious liberty to contest secularism. In particular, ecumenists were concerned about the
deployment of secularism by colonial powers, most infamously the British empire, to frustrate
Christian missionizing in the “non-Christian world.”13 Muslim Africa, long coveted by
missionaries, was a major front in this ecumenical struggle. Given the British empire’s penchant
for “indirect rule” through indigenous institutions, the colonial state governed Muslim Africa
through precolonial Islamic institutions. At the same time, however, the state asserted its
secularity, insisting that its alliance with Islam was merely instrumental and invoking religionstate separation as its justification for curtailing Christian missionary activity. The colonial state
contended, in essence, that secularism was congruent with governance through Muslim
institutions. 14
12

Beery, supra note 8.
WORLD MISSIONARY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE WORLD MISSIONARY CONFERENCE COMMISSION I: CARRYING
OF THE GOSPEL TO ALL THE NON- CHRISTIAN WORLD (1910).
14
With its allowance for governance through indigenous religious institutions, the colonial state’s notion of
secularism, clearly deviates from conventional philosophical understandings of secularism, which identify religionstate separation as the central element of a secularist polity. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). See
also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1980); DONALD EUGENE SMITH, INDIA AS A SECULAR STATE (2015). Yet, the British empire’s assertion of its
secularity is not implausible under critical accounts. Ran Hirschl’s Constitutional Theocracy, for instance, suggests
that rather than separation, degrees of state-religion entanglement characterize secular states. See RAN HIRSCHL,
CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010); JOAN W. SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL (2009). See also Saba Mahmood
& Peter G. Danchin, Immunity or Regulation? Antinomies of Religious Freedom, 113 SOUTH ATLANTIC
QUARTERLY 129 (2014); Rex Ahdar & Ian Leigh, Is establishment consistent with religious freedom, 49 MCGILL
13
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Ecumenists regarded this duality—the state’s governance through Islamic institutions,
and the state’s invocation of a secularist notion of religion-state separation as a justification for
prohibiting missionary activity—as a coherent constitutional arrangement. Far from
contradictory, Islam and secularism were, in fact, characterized as complementary in ecumenical
discourse. As though to foreshadow Barr, ecumenists regarded secularism not as the absence of
religion but rather as the state’s separation from true religion. Secularism could, therefore,
coexist with false orthodoxy, in this case, Islam. Yet, that same unchristian separation,
ecumenists argued, had robbed state and society of “its Christian glory.”15 Their response,
prescient of the Barr agenda, was to craft a Christian preferentialist notion of religious liberty.
This Christian notion of religious liberty would be encapsulated in Article 18 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which has since come to be regarded as the paradigmatic modern
international religious liberty provision.16 Article 18 was, in sum, the product of an impassioned
contestation between a Protestant ecumenical movement keen on securing a prerogative to
spread the gospel to the “non-Christian world” on the one hand, and a secularism in a strange
alliance with Islam on the other. This paper excavates the genealogy of that contestation.
I proceed in three parts. Beginning with the inaugural gathering of the World Missionary
Conference in the summer of 1910, Part I sets out the clash between the Christian missionary
campaign for souls and the British Imperial project. Against the background of this encounter, I
tease out the early origins of the Christian preferentialist notion of religious liberty that would be
developed in later years. Part II zooms in on the ecumenists’ international legal maneuvering
LAW JOURNAL 635 (2003); Alfred C. Stepan, The World’s Religious Systems and Democracy: Crafting the Twin
Tolerations, 11 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 37 (2000) and CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007).
15
Joint Committee on Religious Liberty, Religious Liberty, FEDERAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES (1930).
16
See MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE (2008). For the significance
of the significance of the postwar moment in molding modern notions of human rights, see MARY ANN GLENDON, A
WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001). See
however SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2012).
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from the late interwar to the postwar period and climaxes in the victory of Article 18 at the
United Nations. I return to the U.S. in Part III, arguing that the Article 18 struggle prefigured the
battle between majoritarian religious liberty and secularism in the U.S. In conclusion, I argue
that recovering the history of Article 18 compels us to situate the current legal project of the U.S.
religious right in a sphere beyond the national history of constitutional struggles that have
dominated scholarly attention. Transcending these U.S. histories, I locate the Barr position
within a longer global genealogy, and in the process, de-exceptionalize the Barrian intellectual
current. The goal, ultimately, is not to eclipse the specificity of the anxieties behind the national
struggles over religion and religious difference. Rather than a straightforward historical
progression, this genealogical account is, after all, one of both unmistakable continuities as well
as striking reversals. The intent, then, is to make a case for a close study of the encounters that
galvanize the constitutional ideas of religious liberty and secularism without losing sight of what
global connections reveal about law’s complex relationship with faith and power.

I.

Critiquing Unchristian Separations: Edinburgh 1910 and the Early Ecumenical
Roots of Religious Liberty

Gathering at the inaugural moment of modern global ecumenism in June 1910, the World
Missionary Conference deliberated over the fate of proselytization in the “non-Christian
world.”17 For the ecumenical leaders gathered at Edinburgh, proselytization was the culmination
of Evangelicalism’s spiritual premise, “that Christ died for the world,” into a project—“the world

17

WORLD MISSIONARY CONFERENCE, COMMISSION I, supra note 13. See BRIAN STANLEY, THE WORLD MISSIONARY
CONFERENCE, EDINBURGH 1910 (2009). Although earlier international ecumenical conferences had convened in
1898 and 1900, the 1910 gathering was regarded as the defining moment of Protestant ecumenism.
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must be changed for Christ.”18 It was in pursuit of this project that the conference commenced
the task of envisioning a governance design that would be conducive to this missionary
enterprise. The deliberations of the commission empaneled by the conference to ponder the
question of mission-government relations would reveal the beginnings of twentieth-century
ecumenical thought on religion-state design in the context of missionizing to the non-Christian
world.19
The Edinburgh view started from the premise that European governments were
“Christian.” At the same time, however, ecumenists regarded the complete fusion of church and
state as a feature of “non-Christian” states.20 “Christ,” Reverend Professor G. Hausseleiter of the
University of Halle and author of the commission’s study argued, “drew” a “distinction between
the Kingdom of the Emperor and the Kingdom of God.”21 Nevertheless, this relationship
between the two spheres was not one of separation since Caesar’s sphere is not free of God.22
The report, therefore, espoused a hostility to ungodly separation arrangements. To trump
ungodly separations, the report declared the superiority of the principle of the “freedom of the
church and mission.” As Hausseleiter argued, freedom of the church and mission is “in the
interest of the state” since both are the “conscience of the state.” Beyond this state-interest
rationale for the superiority of the church and mission freedom principle, the case for the
supremacy of the freedom of church and mission also hinged on suspicion of the state. If states

18

TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY 62 (2003). See also JAN H.
BOER, MISSIONARY MESSENGERS OF LIBERATION IN A COLONIAL CONTEXT: A CASE STUDY OF THE SUDAN UNITED
MISSION 205 (1979). Andrew E. Barnes, ‘The Great Prohibition’: The Expansion of Christianity in Northern
Nigeria, 8 HISTORY COMPASS 440 (2010).
19
The Commission on Mission-Government Relations (VII). See WORLD MISSIONARY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF
THE WORLD MISSIONARY CONFERENCE COMMISSION VI: MISSIONS AND GOVERNMENTS (1910).
20
WORLD MISSIONARY CONFERENCE, COMMISSION VI, Appendix E p. 142.
21
Id citing Mat xxii. 21.
22
“it is God who declares what is Ceasar’s”. JOSEPH H. OLDHAM, THE OXFORD CONFERENCE: (OFFICIAL REPORT).
Vol. 8. 70 (1937). See below (Part II) for a discussion of this report.
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are vested with the sole discretion to determine the place of the mission, Hausseleiter posited that
they would invoke the principle of state-mission separation to “try everywhere completely to
exclude the Mission.”23
Hausseleiter’s religion-state model was not an abstract guide; it was articulated in the
context of ecumenical frustration with imperial powers’ invocation of the principle of statemission separation to justify restrictions on missions. Of these, the case of the British empire in
Muslim Africa was a source of particular concern. In those colonies, the British empire’s
assertion of religion-state separation–the central element of the imperial governance idea of
secularism–was complemented by its utilization of Islamic institutions to govern the indigenous
population.24 Yet, ecumenists hardly regarded the alliance of secularism and Islam as
paradoxical; as ecumenical thought would come to lay out with greater clarity in later years,
secularism was not separation from all religion, it was separation from Christianity.25 It was, in
essence, an unchristian separation. This governance design that allied empire with indigenous
institutions while espousing empire’s distance from Christian missions had first emerged in midnineteenth-century British India.

A. British Imperial Secularism

23
24

Id, at 143.
On the origins of British imperial secularism, see PETER

VAN DER

VEER, IMPERIAL ENCOUNTERS: RELIGION

AND

MODERNITY IN INDIA AND BRITAIN 16-20 (2001); NANDINI CHATTERJEE, THE MAKING OF INDIAN SECULARISM: EMPIRE, LAW AND
CHRISTIANITY, 1830-1960 6-9 (2011); CATHERINE S. ADCOCK, THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE: INDIAN SECULARISM AND THE POLITICS
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2013). On British Nigeria, see Rabiat Akande, Secularizing Islam: The Colonial Encounter
and the Making of a British Islamic Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria, 1903–58, 38 LAW & HISTORY REVIEW 459
(2020); BRANDON KENDHAMMER, MUSLIMS TALKING POLITICS: FRAMING ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, AND LAW IN NORTHERN
NIGERIA (2016).
25
See Part II below.
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By several accounts, strains of the constitutional idea of secularism began to emerge in the
British empire in the mid-nineteenth century.26 The 1857 mutiny in British India, understood as a
rebellion of the colonized against the empire’s civilizing project, was the immediate catalyst.27
That revolt led the colonial state to abandon cooperation with missions and turn to governance
through native institutions.28 By announcing a commitment to the religious freedom of colonial
subjects, the Queen’s 1858 declaration of religious and cultural autonomy complemented the
imperial turn from the pursuit of “civilization” to embracing indigenous ways.29 Consequently,
the classical feature of liberal secularism, the state’s separation from religion, was enacted—at
least in the formal sense. Although missionary pressure would soon induce the state to begin
insisting on some distance from indigenous religions–even while it continued to govern through
those institutions–missionary advocates were hardly committed to religion-state separation per
se. What missionaries desired was a return to their original alliance with the state, the ultimate
expression of the freedom of the church and mission. It was when that bid failed that they sought
the barest minimum: empire’s equal distance from all religions.30 Although native institutions
continued to be instrumental for the purpose of administering the territory, the empire,
26

KARUNA MANTENA, ALIBIS OF EMPIRE: HENRY MAINE AND THE ENDS OF LIBERAL IMPERIALISM (2010);
MAHMOOD MAMDANI, DEFINE AND RULE: NATIVE AS POLITICAL IDENTITY (2012); VAN DER VEER, supra note 24;
CHATTERJEE, supra note 24.
27
Although the causes of the mutiny were undoubtedly varied, senior administrators commonly understood the
rebellion as inspired by resentment of anglicizing policies that disregarded indigenous religious and cultural values.
This understanding came to inspire the empire’s response. See MAMDANI supra note 26.
28
For pre-mutiny attitudes to missions, see Ian Copland, Christianity as an Arm of Empire: The Ambiguous Case of
India under the Company, c. 1813-1858, 49 THE HISTORY JOURNAL 1025, (2006). See however BRIAN STANLEY,
THE BIBLE AND THE FLAG: PROTESTANT MISSIONS AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH
CENTURIES (1990). The civilization project was, however, never completely extinguished and there remained
colonial administrators who continued to espouse the civilization goal and within the scope of their administrative
duties, worked to further that goal. See Akande, supra note 24.
29
We declare it our Royal will and pleasure that none be in anywise favored, none molested or disquieted, by reason
of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and
we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference
with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure” Proclamation by the
Queen in Council to the Princes, Chiefs and people of India published by the Governor-General at Allahabad”,
[1858] IOR/L/PS/18/D154 British Library, UK.
30
VAN DER VEER, supra note 24; Nandini Chatterjee, supra note 24; Adcock, supra note 24.
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nevertheless, began to espouse secularism as a statecraft principle for managing religious
difference.31 Invoked not only directly but also through a variety of ideas–neutrality, tolerance,
impartiality–secularism’s essence of avowing religion-state distance had come to be embedded
in colonial thought and policy. The working out of this constitutional idea came to be tied to the
peculiarities of local colonial governance practices; yet one of its clearest articulations across the
empire was the colonial state’s dissociation from missions.
By the time the English Prime Minister, Lord Robert Gascoyne Cecil, would deliver the
keynote at the bicentennial of the Church of England’s Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
in Foreign Parts on June 19, 1900, this mission-empire separation policy had been crystallized.
Lord Cecil sought to explain the rationale for this colonial policy to his missionary audience:
empire-missionary alliance, Cecil argued, was bad, both for missionaries and the British
government. It detracted from the missionary enterprise because it diminished “the purely
spiritual aspect and action of Christian teaching” and hurt the government by representing that it
was partial to missionary interests. Since Cecil was delivering his speech while the Boxer
rebellion, noted for its widespread attacks on missionaries, was ongoing in China, the Prime
Minister was quick to cite the Chinese example:
“You observe that all the people slaughtered [by the Chinese] are Christian. Do you imagine that
they are slaughtered simply because the Chinese dislike their religion? There is no nation in the
world so indifferent on the subject of religion as the Chinese. It is because they and other nations
have got the idea that missionary work is a mere instrument of the secular government in order to
achieve the objects it has in view. That is a most dangerous and terrible snare.”32

31
32

Id.
The Times Weekly Edition, June 22, 1900.
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B. Missions, Empire and Islamicate Africa
Given this long history of British imperial secularism, Edinburgh ecumenists understood that
Islam was not the only religion being privileged by the British empire to the disfavor of
Christianity. In fact, the missionary experience in India was also a matter of deliberation at the
conference and Edinburgh deliberations reflected a disapproval of all unchristian separations.
Islam would, however, remain central to this critique. Indeed, while the Commission would
conclude that the jury was still out on the India case, it was unequivocal that Islam was
emblematic of the unfriendly religion-separation promoted by the British government.33
Ecumenists’ preoccupation with Muslim Africa was undoubtedly tied to the allure of both
Islam and Africa to the missionary enterprise. Islam had long been dominant in the missionary
project and African Islam was a uniquely formidable challenge. As Thomas Prasch put it: “For
the late-Victorian missionary enterprise, Islam represented the quintessential Other: the faith that
was most resistant, most competitive. And for Victorians, Africa was the obvious arena of
contention, the blankest continent on the imperial map.”

34

That missions regarded Islam as a

competitor in this campaign for souls only heightened the attraction of the African Evangelical
mission. As the Edinburgh report acknowledged, “the ubiquitous and rapid advance of Islam is
the great challenge to urgency in the evangelization of Africa.”35
Three territories were of “extreme concern” to ecumenists—the British colonies of
Sudan, Egypt, and Northern Nigeria.36 The mission-minded churchmen found the case of

33

REPORT OF THE WORLD MISSIONARY CONFERENCE COMMISSION VII, supra note 19 at 24.
Thomas Prasch, Which God for Africa: The Islamic-Christian Missionary Debate in Late-Victorian England, 33
VICTORIAN STUDIES 51 (1989).
35
WORLD MISSIONARY CONFERENCE, COMMISSION I, supra note 13, 207 (1910).
36
Id.
34
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Northern Nigeria particularly troubling. The convener of the Edinburgh conference, Joseph H.
Oldham, was no stranger to the mission question in Northern Nigeria. Oldham, a Scottish
missionary of the Church Missionary Society37 and founder of the first international ecumenical
Protestant group,38 was an ardent advocate for missions struggling to access the Northern Nigeria
mission field. Northern Nigeria was home to Sokoto, the renowned caliphate of precolonial
Africa, and continued to be widely regarded as one of the most orthodox Islamic polities in the
first half of the twentieth century.39

Writing of Northern Nigeria’s legal system, J.N.D.

Anderson, Christian missionary, foremost western Islamic law expert and Professor at the School
of Oriental and African Studies in London observed: “At present, ... Islamic law is more widely,
and in some respects, more rigidly applied in Northern Nigeria than anywhere else outside
Arabia … orthodoxy … has been preserved first by a century of virtual isolation and then by half
a century of colonial administration...”40
Anderson’s assessment was hardly inch-perfect since colonial indirect rule did not
conserve the precolonial caliphal theocracy. In fact, European administrators’ description of the
Muslim chiefs as “secular chiefs” through whom the state governed was a subtle reference to the
radical colonial reform of caliphal institutions.41 Nevertheless, the state was entangled with
caliphal institutions in ways that privileged those institutions relative to those of other faiths.
37

This operated under the Church of England’s Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts.
The International Missionary Council. The IMC was a product of the 1910 World Missionary Conference and
later became the international ecumenical movement’s division focused on global missionary affairs in Asia and
Africa.
39
See for example, NORMAN ANDERSON, ISLAMIC LAW IN AFRICA 219 (2013).
40
Id.
41
Colonialism altered the precolonial relationship between jurists and political authorities--from their precolonial
prerogative of expounding the law, jurists came to apply the interpretation of the law communicated by Emirs who
were themselves communicating the wishes of colonial administrators. Therefore, law-making prerogative resided in
the colonial state. See Rabiat Akande, Secularizing Islam: The Colonial Encounter and the Making of a British
Islamic Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria, 1903–58, 38 LAW & HISTORY REVIEW 459 (2020). See also Asifa
Quraishi-Landes, Islamic Constitutionalism: Not Secular, Not Theocratic, Not Impossible, 16 RUTGERS JOURNAL OF
LAW & RELIGION 553, 559 (2014).
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Notably, empire turned a blind eye to precolonial religious diversity and multiple state
formations and governed the now-united territory through its caliphal intermediaries.
The colonial policy restricting Christian missions was closely tied to this governance
arrangement: missions were prohibited from proselytizing in areas with Muslim populations,
which effectively kept the project of the gospel out of large swaths of the territory. The result
was that missionary efforts would bear little fruit; when the 1952 census would be conducted
more than five decades after the commencement of missionary activity, it merely confirmed what
missions feared: Christians were a mere “sprinkling” of the population, at 2.3 percent.42
Muslims, on the other hand, remained the majority at 73 percent and animists, the adherents of
indigenous religions, constituted 24.13 percent.43
Placing the blame for the dismal performance on the colonial religion-state design,
Edinburgh 1910 declared it “a disgrace to British rule in tropical Africa that it should anywhere
favor Islam and discourage the extension of Christian missions.”44 Conference delegates accused
the British colonial government of enacting religion-state separation to the benefit of Islam and
simultaneously, to the disfavor of the Christian missionary enterprise. The misfortune in Muslim
Africa was, therefore, not merely the British empire’s separation from Christian missions; it was
also its alliance with Islam. In particular, Edinburgh 1910 delegates were concerned with the
obstructive effect of the classical Islamic legal doctrine of ridda (apostasy) on missionary
proselytization efforts.
42
See Sir Kenneth G. Grubb, London Conference Faces Problems, CHURCH OF ENGLAND NEWSPAPER, May 31,
1957.
43
1952 CENSUS: NIGERIA FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PRINTERS (1952). This was in contrast to the missionary success
in Southwestern and Eastern regions of the country, which did not have a predominant Muslim population in
precolonial years. The 1952 Census put Christians in Eastern Nigeria at 50 percent animists at 49.6 percent and
Muslims at 0.3 percent Southwestern Nigeria, which had a sizable Muslim population in precolonial years but
lacked the organized caliphal structure of the North, was recorded to have a 36.9 percent Christian population, 32.8
percent Muslim population and 30.3 percent espousing animist affiliations.
44
See for instance REPORT OF THE WORLD MISSIONARY CONFERENCE, COMMISSION I, supra note 13, at 113.
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Religious faith and citizenship were closely intertwined in the Islamic polities that raised
ecumenical concerns.45 Non-Muslims were levied Jizyah, a tax symbolizing their acceptance of
the sovereignty of the Islamic state—and an equivalent of the zakat levied on Muslims. Like the
political-cum-legal doctrine governing religious difference, the classical legal doctrine of
apostasy (“ridda”) was symptomatic of the nexus between faith and citizenship.46 In a state
where religion was the basis of citizenship, to renounce one’s religion was tantamount to
shedding oneself of the obligations of citizenship to the state and akin, according to some
scholars, to the modern doctrine of treason.47 The major Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence
prescribed both civil and criminal legal consequences for ridda, including in some instances, the
capital penalty.
It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the critique of the doctrine of ridda came to feature
prominently in international ecumenical deliberations on the legal design of a religious freedom
provision that would liberate the missionary enterprise. If Edinburgh initiated this ecumenical
censure, latter ecumenical gatherings would intensify the critique. In fact, ecumenical
deliberations glided over the nuances in the doctrine, including its de facto defunct status, in
some precolonial Muslim states, including the much-abhorred Sokoto caliphate. Even beyond the
confines of Sokoto, Muslim jurists disagreed over whether it applied beyond early and medieval
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ABDULLAHI AHMED AN‐NAʾIM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST) (1996). See also MUHAMMAD ALMUBARAK, NIZAM AL-ISLAM: AL-HUKM WA AL-DAULAH (1997); F. H. Ruxton, The Convert's Status in Maliki
Law, 3 THE MUSLIM WORLD 37 (1913).
46
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the term.” PROSELYTIZATION AND COMMUNAL SELF-DETERMINATION IN AFRICA 15-16 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im
ed., 2009). See AN‐NAʾIM, supra note 45. Towards an Islamic Reformation. Syracuse: SUP. See Intisar A. Rabb,
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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Anver M. Emon, Mark Ellis and Benjamin Ellis, ed. 2016). See further ALMUBARAK, supra note 45; AN-NA'IM, supra note 45; Ruxton, supra note 45.
47
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De Vries, Apostasy in Islam, 17 DIE WELT DES ISLAM 1 (1976).
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Islamic polities and whether it was generally applicable to all Muslims. To give an example, a
strand of Maliki jurisprudence, the dominant school of thought in large swaths of Africa, argued
that the capital penalty was only applicable where the convert had been a “good Muslim.”48 Who
a “good Muslim” was, was hardly settled. Eventually, the capital penalty for ridda would fall
into desuetude, long before colonial rule.49 And even though the colonial state codified a version
of Maliki jurisprudence, meaning that ridda was technically on the books,50 no criminal penalty
for ridda was ever applied. Nevertheless, colonial administrators invoked Islamic law and
societal aversion to conversion as the basis for “public order” regulations prohibiting
proselytization by missionaries.51 By construing public order with reference to Islamic law and
Muslim attitudes, administrators deployed an ostensibly neutral value to privilege the religious
majority to the detriment of Christian missions.52
Castigating the constraints on proselytization as “the Great Prohibition,” missionaries
insisted that empire’s religion-state design infringed on their primary obligation to spread
Christianity to the “non-Christian world.”53 Missionaries were, however, convinced that they
were in a struggle not only with a constitutional idea of organizing empire. They understood the
constitutional arrangement espousing empire’s separation from Christian missions to be rooted in
the unchristian lives of colonial administrators. Missionaries, for example, commonly criticized
48

This included West Africa, North Africa (save for Northern and Eastern Egypt) as well as significant parts of
Central and Eastern Africa.
49
Peters & De Vries, supra note 47. For Nigeria in particular, see AFRICAN PENAL SYSTEMS (Alan Milner ed.,
1969)..
50
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SÎDÎ KHALÎL: WITH NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY (1916). Ruxton’s text purported to be a codification of Islamic law of
the Maliki school of jurisprudence.
51
Such as in inheritance. See Peters & De Vries, supra note 47.
52
For a classic administrative formulation of the public order rule see LUGARD, THE DUAL MANDATE IN BRITISH
TROPICAL AFRICA (1922). Specifically, administrators cited the possibility of a revolt, arguing that such a rebellion
would also compel the state to deploy force in support of Europeans.
53
As coined by missionary historian Jan Boer. Boer’s reference was to the ‘Great Commission’, according to which
Christ enjoined Christians to evangelize. See JAN H. BOER, MISSIONARY MESSENGERS OF LIBERATION IN A
COLONIAL CONTEXT: A CASE STUDY OF THE SUDAN UNITED MISSION 205 (1979); See Barnes, supra note 18.
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administrators for being “utterly ungodly, all living loose lives, all having women brought to
them wherever they are.”54 Consequently, missionaries did not seek a principled separation of
the state from religion. Although they campaigned for the state to dissociate itself from caliphal
institutions as a way to facilitate proselytization and conversion, this was not a call for
separation. What missions sought, instead, was for the state to ally itself with missions–as it had
done at the inception of imperial rule–or, in the alternative, for the state to govern the territory
through ‘less fanatical’ Muslims who would be more amenable to proselytization efforts, and
perhaps, open to conversion.55 Far from acceding to imperial secularism or even calling for the
principled separation of the state from all religions, missions championed a notion of religious
liberty that would protect the Evangelical enterprise.
To be sure, religious liberty was not absent from the legal framework of the colonial
state. The Queen’s 1858 declaration in the aftermath of the Indian mutiny had proclaimed
religious liberty for colonial populations. In addition, the legal instrument that had ushered in
formal colonialism on the African continent in general, the Berlin General Act of 1885,
mandated European powers to protect “freedom of conscience” and guarantee “religious
toleration” to all “natives, subjects and foreigners” in their respective colonial territories.56 To
the extent, however, that colonial administrators construed these legal pronouncements as
primarily intended for the benefit of indigenous populations, they served only to bolster the
empire’s insistence on separation from missions. Consequently, the ecumenical notion of
religious liberty stood at odds with that espoused by the state. For the state, religious liberty
54

Miller to Bayllis Sept 5, 1902 CMS/G3/A9/01 CERC RECORDS
Miller to Lugard CMS G3/A9/01 July 29, 1903. See Rabiat Akande, Navigating Entanglements (May 2019)
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required that Muslims be shielded from missionary proselytization in pursuit of the goal of
preserving native institutions—which were indispensable tools for the colonial project. Since
proselytization hindered that goal, it had to be curtailed. To missionaries, however,
proselytization was the right of both the proselytizer and the target audience; religious liberty
protected not only the right of the proselyte to proselytize, it also conferred on the target of the
proselytization the right to receive the message.57
As the inaugural gathering of world ecumenists invested in the missionary
enterprise, Edinburgh 1910, therefore, provided a golden opportunity to begin the task of
envisioning a religion-state design that would withstand the challenge of imperial secularism and
its alliance with Islam. It was, however, the ecumenical efforts of the interwar to early postwar
period that would climax this project of developing a Protestant notion of religious freedom.58 In
those years, the ecumenical movement would finalize its religious freedom blueprint and
champion the international legal and constitution-making processes that would actualize its
vision.59

II: Contesting’ Secularism’ and ‘Islamic Orthodoxy:’ The Global Ecumenical Movement
and the Making of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration
57
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Edinburgh marked the inception of the ecumenical critique of unchristian separation—an
imperial policy and colonial sensibility that had its roots in the intellectual idea of secularism.
Nevertheless, the description of the abhorred state design as secular was more typically
associated with colonial administrators in the Edinburgh years. Only sparingly did Edinburgh
ecumenists deploy the term ‘secular;’ the ecclesiastical brethren devoted much of their energies
to describing the crux of the constitutional problem–unchristian separations–rather than naming
it.60 It was in the interwar years, those between the end of the first and second world wars , that
the ecumenical movement would put a name to the old “enemy”–secularism.61
As first described by the 1928 gathering of the International Missionary Council
Conference in Jerusalem, secularism was not the absence of religion, it was a comprehensive
belief, a “system of life and thought.”62 Secularism amounted to paganism and both, ecumenists
argued, were in “defiance of God’s sovereignty.”63 By asserting “human self-sufficiency,”
secularism culminated in moral, political, and economic systems based on the “deification” of
the “world” as well as the “self.”64 Unchristian separations were, consequently, not the cause of
secularism; they were a symptom. Ecumenists further argued that secularism was a malady
60

It was in the context of criticizing the colonial policy excluding Christian instruction in schools that the Edinburgh
report features a mention of the term: “secular.” See WORLD MISSIONARY CONFERENCE, COMMISSION I REPORT,
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afflicting the entire world and threatening Christianity everywhere.65 The challenge to the
missionary enterprise abroad by supposedly Christian empires was already a reflection of this
threat. The problem was, therefore, not merely the violent repression of the Church by Soviet
communism and German national socialism; even in those Western European states that did not
feature this intense hostility, ecumenists were concerned with the increased disempowerment of
churches and the decreased salience of Christianity in the lives of European populations.66 In a
1929 lecture to the Dutch Missionary Conference titled “The Christianizing and Unchristianizing
of the World,” Joseph Oldham would declare that “the demonic attempt to put the world or the
self in the place of God … has stricken at the heart of Europe.

67

It was the marginalization of

Christianity, ecumenists were convinced, that produced the imperial policy that alienated
Christian missions abroad. Capturing this ecumenical alarm at the dechristianization of the
world, William Temple, Rector at St. Paul’s Piccadilly and future Archbishop of Canterbury
declared: “the world has gone pagan.”68 The question on the mind of ecumenists then was: “what
is a Christian to do?”69
By the late interwar period, the ecumenical movement went beyond this initial concern; it
began to regard the struggle with secularism as a threat to the “very existence of the church.” 70
Articulating this crisis in Faeno, Denmark in August 1934, the Universal Christian Council’s
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Life and Work Movement set out the broad outlines of a conference to deliberate on the churchstate question and respond to the challenges posed by the new paganism.
Reflecting this recognition of secularism’s connections with ‘false’ religion, the theme of
Oxford 1937 was “the life-and-death struggle between Christian faith and the secular and pagan
tendencies of our time.”71 The Oxford Conference of the Life and Work Movement, regarded as
the most significant event in twentieth-century ecumenism, called on the Church to dismantle
constraints on Christianity in Europe and abroad with the idea of “freedom of religion.” In its
report, the Universal Church in the World of Nations, the Conference affirmed the centrality of
“freedom of religion” in a “better international order.” According to the Conference, church
advocacy was in pursuit of “freedom of conscience” of both Christians and non-Christians. The
Conference asserted: “we do not ask for any privilege to be granted to Christians that is denied to
others. While the liberty with which Christ has set us free can neither be given nor destroyed by
any government, Christians, because of that inner freedom are both jealous for its outward
expression and solicitous that all men should have freedom in religious life.”72 The Conference
was careful to condemn socioeconomic privileges granted to European Christians in some
imperial territories; it affirmed: “We deprecate any attempt by Christians to secure under the
shelter of the power or prestige of their nations any privileges in other countries in such matters
as civil status, the holding of property, or the language of education.” Yet, this caution was not a
call for the disestablishment of the church, a point that the Conference would make clear in its
other report—the Church and State.
71
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Issued by the Conference section chaired by Max Huber, the renowned Swiss churchman
and Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Church-State report is particularly
significant for the insight it provides into the ecumenical movement’s thought on church-state
relations. As a structural matter, Oxford 1937, like Edinburgh 1910 insisted that the biblical
analogy of Caesar-God separation did not support the church-state separation evinced by
secularist tendencies. As the report put it, “it is God who declares what is Caesar’s.”73 This
inclination towards establishment was, however, conditional. The report suggested that the
ultimate relationship between Church and state ought to be determined by the nature of the state.
Where the state fails to live up to its God-given duty of “upholding law and order,” “ministering
to the life of the people united within it”74 and becomes an “instrument of evil,”75 the church
ought to take on a position of “criticism or opposition” since the church is “not the lord” but
rather a mere “servant of justice.”76 Not only was ecumenical approval of establishment
contingent on the nature of the state, it also hinged on a particular religion: the Christian church.
77

Oxford 1937 ecumenists were gravely concerned with the effect of secularization on state
and society. Secularization, Conference delegates concluded, had “robbed” the state of its
“religious glamor,” leading to absolutist tendencies and hostility towards the church by the state.
This hostility manifested not only in the visible repression of the Church resembling “preConstantine conditions”78 but also in the less obvious phenomenon of favoring the Church not as
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an intrinsic good but for the benefits it could offer the state.79

Within “society,” Conference

delegates pointed out, secularization had given rise to materialism.80 Although secularism had
dechristianized state and society, the Conference was careful to emphasize that its claim to be
devoid of religion was increasingly tenuous. To fill the spiritual vacuum left by Christianity, both
the secularized state and secularized humanity had, in fact, turned to “new forms of faith,” made
“new idols” and rediscovered “old religion.”81 This old religion, according to the Conference,
was the quintessential sin of human glorification. Therefore, ecumenists did not imagine that
secularism of the state and secularization of society had eradicated religion; rather, they were
convinced that false gods and secularism could, in fact, coexist. American-English Poet, T.S
Eliot’s 1940 work, The Idea of a Christian Society, encapsulates ecumenists’ equation of secular
constitutional arrangements with false orthodoxy.82 In the book, which emerged from Eliot’s
lectures during and after Oxford 1937, the ecumenist who jointly founded a “conservative thinktank” with J.H. Oldham equated a “neutral society” with a “pagan society.”83 In the context of
this broader ecumenical understanding of secularism as a comprehensive, albeit “false” belief,
the Islamist and secular features of places like Colonial Northern Nigeria were not only
compatible but in fact, complementary.
To counter this slide into paganism, Eliot and his ecumenical brethren at Oxford called
for the making of a “Christian society.” Although Oxford ecumenists were enthralled by the
benefits of establishment to the Christian church, the Conference, nevertheless, recognized that
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establishment did not always correlate with the freedom of the Church.84 Ecumenists, therefore,
cautioned that where establishment would deprive the church of certain freedoms, the church has
a duty to free herself and retrieve the freedoms “even at the cost of disestablishment.” These
freedoms of the church, which were crucial both in establishment and non-establishment
regimes, included the freedom to determine its faith and creed; freedom of public and private
worship, preaching and teaching, freedom from any imposition by the state, of religious
ceremonies and forms of worship; and freedom of Christian service and missionary activity both
at home and in foreign lands.85 Expectedly, Oxford 1937 was preoccupied with the question of
evangelization. As the Oxford Church-State report stressed in its concluding lines: “The one
thing that matters is that it [the church] should be free to proclaim the good news of Christ,
without let or hindrance, in accordance with the commission given to the church by its Lord.”86
When the International Missionary Conference would reconvene the following year in
Tambaram, India, it would put the issue of proselytization at the center of its agenda, listing
these as part of the “most essential” rights.87
The Oxford Conference’s most far-reaching decision was its establishment of the World
Council of Churches (WCC) with the specific goal of working towards the making of an
international legal provision on religious liberty. The WCC would go on to establish the
Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA) to achieve this goal. Specifically,
the rights conception to be advanced by the WCC was rooted in the idea of “Christian
84
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personalism:” that “the human being [is] a theological person in community with others and in
partnership with God.”88 Although universal, the personalist notion of humanity was therefore
rooted in Christian theology and the firm missionary conviction that all men were potential
Christians.89 Although Oxford 1937 had resolved that it was incumbent on the church to defend
universal humanity regardless of nationality, race, or class, this universal mandate was to be
molded by Christian personalism and the primacy of religious freedom as the foundation for all
rights. As the WCC would declare several years later at a 1949 Chichester meeting:
“a peaceful and stable order can only be built upon foundations of righteousness, of right
relations between man and God and between man and man. Only the recognition that man has
ends and loyalties beyond the State will ensure true justice to the human person. Religious
freedom is the condition and guardian of all true freedom.”90
This notion that religious freedom was the foundation of human rights had been
advanced by the famous Six Pillars of Peace, issued by the John Foster Dulles-chaired American
Federal Council of Churches’ (FCC) Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace
in 1943. Dulles had himself been a platform speaker on international affairs at the Oxford
Conference and was actively involved in the Conference’s Universal Church and the World of
Nations report. Six Pillars of Peace not only called for an international bill of rights, but it also
advocated for religious liberty as its “essential linchpin.”91 The FCC and the American
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Protestants it represented were immersed in this project of internationalizing a personalist notion
of rights and considered religious freedom to be its foundation.92 Indeed, this missionary
campaign for the centrality of religious freedom to postwar international order had begun to gain
political traction even before the FCC’s Six Pillars. For instance, President Roosevelt had
outlined religious liberty as part of the four basic freedoms in his famous address to Congress in
1941.93 When the Atlantic Charter subsequently concluded between Roosevelt and Winston
Churchill of the United Kingdom failed to explicitly reference the freedom of worship, Roosevelt
would come under such intense criticism from the Protestant coalition that the American
President would be prompted to submit to Congress: “it is unnecessary for me to point out that
the declaration of principles includes of necessity the world need for freedom of religion and
freedom of information. No society of the world organized under the announced principles could
survive without these freedoms which are a part of the whole freedom for which we strive.”94
It was therefore unsurprising that U.S. Protestants came to be at the forefront of
harnessing international ecumenical thought on religious freedom into a concrete international
legal provision. CCIA’s inaugural director and architect of Article 18 was Otto Frederick Nolde,
Dean of the Graduate School at the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia. Prior to his
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND AMERICAN POWER (2016), FREDERICK O. NOLDE, FREE AND EQUAL: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
ECUMENICAL PERSPECTIVE WITH REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, (Frederick O. Nolde ed., 1968).
92
For an account of how American Protestantism took on the mantle of internationalized human rights, see Gene
Zubovich, The Global Gospel: Protestant Internationalism and American Liberalism, 1940–1960 (2014)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley).
93
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Quincy Wright, Human Rights and the World Order, 21 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 238 (1942-1943). On the
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STATES 1940-1945 975 (Appendix B) (1958) (reproducing H. Doc. 358/77C1/1941). See also EVANS, supra note 16,
at 174.
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time at the CCIA, Nolde had served as spokesman of the Joint Committee on Religious Liberty
(JCRL) jointly established by the FCC and the Foreign Missions Conference in North America in
1942. Like the CCIA, the aim of the JCRL was the crafting of an international legal provision on
religious freedom.95 Further, the JCRL like the CCIA made the freedom to proselytize and
convert a crucial element in this envisaged international legal provision.96
A useful lens through which one might understand the JCRL’s postwar vision of religious
liberty is its report, Religious Liberty: An Inquiry, published in 1945 and authored by Miner
Searle Bates, Baptist missionary and Professor of History at China’s Nanking University.97
Disregarding the horrors of the Holocaust, Religious Liberty found the most extreme cases of
denial of religious liberty in Soviet Russia, Franco’s Spain, and “Moslem Countries.” Indeed, the
report considered the restrictions on religious freedom by Soviet Russia as not only the action of
a totalitarian state but really, evidence of the “profound incompatibility” of religious liberty and
the secularism espoused by communism.98 While Russia, therefore, represented extreme hostility
to religion, the report argued that Spain’s problem lay in the monopoly of the Roman Catholic
Church and the resulting infringement of religious liberty of people of other religions.
In the case of “Orthodox Islam,” the report found it to be “the contrary of religious
liberty” that “finds no room for the concept as developed in Western lands.”99 The report, which
spans close to six hundred pages, identified the doctrine of ridda as the primary culprit for this
95

Nolde also served as an associate in the FCC’s advisory group to the US delegation to the UN charter talks. The
task of the group was the promotion of human rights in the charter negotiations.
96
Its Statement on Religious Liberty provides: “Religious liberty shall be interpreted to include freedom of worship
according to conscience and to bring up children in the faith of their parents; freedom for the individual to change
his religion; freedom to preach, educate, publish, and carry on missionary activities; and freedom to organize with
others and to acquire and hold property, for these purposes.”
97
SEARLE MILNER BATES, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN INQUIRY 9 (New York and London; Harper Bros, 1945).
98
Bates argued that communism was in some ways akin to religion though “without the name, providing for men, a
conviction of destiny, a bond of emotion and action, prophets and saints of authority if not actual saviors, an ethic
systematically inculcated, a message and program of salvation for the multitude.” BATES, supra note 97, at 3.
99
Id. at 9.
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absence of religious liberty. Although Bates and the JCRL were concerned with restrictions on
Hinduism to Christianity conversions in India, they considered Islamic restrictions to be the most
egregious violation of religious liberty. Bates stressed that Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, and
Northern Sudan were the only Near East countries with an established and recognized procedure
regarding conversions from Islam, and attributed the departure to influences external to Islam.
Even in these cases of permitted conversions, converts were, in Bates’ account, subject to
disabilities in issues concerning inheritance and employment among others. Even the classical
status of ahl al-kitab (People of the Book) guaranteeing communal protection for Christians and
Jews in Muslim territories did not escape critique. Bates argued that this legal status merely
permitted these religions “to continue in quiescent communities, on sufferance as long as they do
not challenge the dominant Islamic society.” The religious liberty agenda, the JCRLcommissioned report declared, was targeted at addressing “the socio-religious-political pressures
for uniformity in the Mohammedan societies.”100
Religious Liberty adopted a remarkably generous tone in its assessment of the allied
West. Beyond its identification of paganistic secularism and the consequent subjugation of
religious liberty with the East, the report was careful to not implicate Western colonial powers in
its critique of Islamic orthodoxy. In analyzing the case of Northern Nigeria, for instance, the
report centered its critique solely on Islam. Minimally commenting on British indirect rule’s
propensity to bolster precolonial religion in the territory, Religious Liberty praised Britain’s
tradition of tolerance as a potentially positive influence on orthodox Islamic practices in
Northern Nigeria. In Egypt, the report blamed Islamic orthodoxy’s co-option of constitutional
text and politics and in Turkey, the culprit was the meeting of the faith with nationalism and
100

Id. at 305
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authoritarianism.101 Indeed, condemnation of colonial powers’ culpability in the restrictions on
religious liberty was limited to Roman Catholic European Powers particularly in Mussolini’s
Africa.102 The report was therefore emphatic in its location of the problem of religious liberty
outside of the West.103
It is important to acknowledge the points of contact between Religious Liberty and
general ecumenical thought. Like the Oxford report and the thought espoused at Edinburgh 1910,
Religious Liberty was not averse to the establishment of Christianity and did not regard it as a
threat to religious freedom. Indeed, Religious Liberty was effusive in its praise for the British
tradition of establishment of the Church of England, arguing that it featured a “high degree of
religious liberty” and “a tradition of social tolerance.”104 Although the report acknowledged that
the British constitutional arrangement tied key political appointments to members of the Church
of England and granted Parliament authority over forms of worship,105 it regarded these features
as insignificant.106
Religious liberty’s sanction of the intermingling of church and state was also apparent in
its analysis of U.S. constitutional practice. Besides England, the U.S. was the other beacon of
religious liberty highlighted in Bates’ report. Importantly, the report did not consider U.S.
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However, the report found laicist Ataturk Turkey was “tending towards” religious liberty, in a remarkable
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(1949) in Reynolds, supra note 61, at 292.
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BATES, supra note 97 at 111.
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For instance, the amendment to the Church’s Book of Prayers in 1934 required the endorsement of the
Parliament. Bates cites CECILIA M. ADY, THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND HOW IT WORKS (1940).
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religious liberty to be the necessary product of church-state separation. As Bates pointed out, the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was not intended to prescribe church-state separation
but was rather designed to prevent the Federal Government’s interference with the church-state
entanglements that existed during the making of the First Amendment. U.S. national policy on
religion, according to Bates, was “separation of state from church, but not from Christianity.”107
Citing Christian prayers at government events, Sunday’s work-free status, holidays with
Christian roots, and blasphemy laws based on Christian ideas, Bates pointed out that these
features of the U.S. religion-state arrangement amounted to “informal support of Christianity”108
and protected the “Christian standards of the majority.”109 Nevertheless, Bates stressed that these
manifestations of the entanglement of the church with state did not amount to restrictions on
religious liberty pointing to the “popular American view that entire religious liberty had been
secured” and the approval, “even … envy,” of European scholars for American religious
liberty.110
Although Bates conceded that church-state separation might sometimes correlate to a
higher degree of religious liberty than church-state union, he insisted that the evidence was not
conclusive. Church-state separation, Bates argued, may be a mere manifestation of
secularization, rather than the “triumph of free religion” that is the true goal of religious
liberty.111 Secularization was, in Bates’ formulation, the separation of religion from community
life and not compatible with religious freedom. Rather, Religious Liberty advocated for “friendly
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separations,” which it described as church-state arrangements permitting “little or much
voluntary co-operation between Church and State as the citizens may desire and agree upon.”112
These “friendly separations,” which Bates found to be based on a fundamentally
Christian idea,113 charted the middle-course between the extremes of “state-implemented
religion” and “individualistic religion” and would permit the triumph of the free religion
advocated by the report. Marking out the uniqueness of Protestant thought on religious liberty,
Bates argues that the mainline-Protestant position is the most favorable to religious liberty,
taking great care to compare it to the Islamic position (which he dismisses) and the Roman
Catholic approach (which he argues is marked by the exaltation of the liberty of the church rather
than that of the individual).114 Hence, Religious Liberty’s approval for establishment was not
absolute, as it condemned both the ‘Islamic Orthodox’ and Spanish arrangements. Neither did
Religious Liberty imagine that the secularization of state and society held the answer since
secularization was named as a key culprit in the infringement of religious liberty.
Ultimately, the report emulated Oxford 1937 by recommending the adoption of an
“International Bill of Rights” or “International Charter of Liberties”115 to tackle constraints on
religious liberty. As with Oxford, prominent among the provisions in this bill were to be rights to
worship, convert, preach, and teach. Nevertheless, the JCRL report indulgently chided the
“unrealistic efforts” in ecumenical circles to center the advocacy for these rights on the
movement’s Christian personalist notions. Consequently, while the report advanced the
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proposals of ecumenical groups, 116 it, at the same time, put forth the proposal designed by the
American Law Institute’s Committee of Advisors on Human Rights. The Committee, which
drew representatives from the United States, Britain, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy,
Latin-America, Poland, Soviet Russia, and Syria, had been commissioned by the Council on
American Law Institute. Unlike the ecumenical proposals cited in Religious Liberty and forming
the crux of its rights charter plan, the proposal of the ALI Committee did not provide for the
right to convert or proselytize.117 Although both the JCRL and the U.S. Federal Council of
Churches as well as their global ecumenical colleagues would continue to insist on these core
rights, the inclusion of the ALI Committee proposal was reflective of the outlook of the
American ecumenists. The American Protestant elites, particularly Dulles and Nolde, were in
fact, criticized by global ecumenical counterparts, including the Swiss jurist Max Huber, as
attempting to “translate” the Protestant project of “personhood” into “a legal idiom with broad
appeal to people of goodwill whether or not Christian.”118
Like other JCRL elites, Nolde regarded Religious Liberty as a key achievement.
Reviewing the report in The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, Nolde
stressed that its significance lay in its contribution to the “urgent” global imperative of securing
human rights.119 The JCRL spokesman then commended the report to those striving to actualize
that goal. Three years later, Nolde would become the inaugural director of the World Council of
Churches’ Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA). In that capacity, Nolde
116
Id. at 321-23 & 570. These statements were issued by the Joint Committee on Religious Liberty (1944); British
Commission of the Churches for International Friendship and Social Responsibility (1939); an “informal group” of
American Protestants and Roman Catholics.
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Id. at 570. See also The Statement of Essential Human Rights, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://www.ali.org/news/articles/statement-essential-human-rights/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2020).
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Missionary Council, 1945. $3.50, 53 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
150 (1946).

32

Rabiat Akande 9.21
Forthcoming in the Journal of Law and Religion

would not only have the opportunity to actualize the JCRL vision, but he would also come to be
integral to the formulation of the international charter that Religious Liberty proposed.120
Acknowledging Nolde’s work in the crafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Eleanor Roosevelt, chair of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, pointed out that Nolde was
the most active NGO delegate to the negotiations and drafting proceedings of the instrument. 121
The ecumenical movement’s participation was not limited to the NGO delegation. Charles
Malik, prominent Lebanese member of the CCIA was Rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights and Dulles was actively involved in the San Francisco drafting and negotiation
proceedings that produced Article 18.122 Nevertheless, Nolde is credited with actualizing the
ecumenical movement’s goal. In Malik’s words, Article 18, the Universal Declaration’s
provision on religious liberty was “principally his [Nolde’s] fashioning.”123 For the ecumenical
brethren, Article 18 was the core of the rights provisions in the Universal Declaration since they
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had always held fast to the view that religious liberty was the foundation of all rights.124 As
Malik would admit:
“though I cared for every word in the Declaration, I felt that if we should lose this Article on
freedom of conscience and religion … my interest in the remainder of the Declaration would
considerably flag…. Without the full and unimpaired right to think and believe freely, the value
of these other rights pales into relative insignificance.”
In its final form, Article 18 would capture the thrust of ecumenical concerns: “Everyone
has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and
observance.”125Article 18’s protection of conversion, and implicitly, the right to proselytize,
were crafted to address the challenges Islamic orthodoxy posed to missionary activity in places
such as Muslim Africa. By affirming the right of the proselyte to evangelize as well as the right
of the target to accept the message, Article 18 aimed to override the Islamic doctrine of ridda and
dismantle legal and administrative constraints on missionaries seeking to spread the gospel.
Of the infamous trio identified at Edinburgh 1910–Sudan, Northern Nigeria and Egypt–
only Egypt was present at the Article 18 drafting proceedings since much of Muslim Africa had
not attained independent statehood at the time. Together with Saudi Arabia, Egypt mounted a
critique on Article 18’s provisions on conversion and proselytization.126 The states challenged
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Article 18 as the product of an empire-missionary alliance intended to further the European
missionizing project and cited instances in which missionary activity had stirred unrest and
religious conflict which had paved the way for imperial expansion.127 Jamil Baroody, Saudi
Arabia’s representative, pointed out that “throughout history, missionaries had often abused their
rights by becoming the forerunners of political intervention, and there were many instances
where peoples had been drawn into murderous conflict by the missionaries’ efforts to convert
them.”128 Yet, Muslim opinion was by no means unanimous. Unlike Saudi Arabia and Egypt,
Pakistan supported the freedom of conversion provision, arguing that freedom of religion is
intrinsic to Islamic law. Ridda, Pakistan argued, was a “spiritual offence” and therefore not the
subject of worldly penalties. In the words of Zafrullah Khan, the Pakistani delegate, “however
condemnable [apostacy] is a spiritual offense and entails no temporal penalty. This is the essence
of the freedom to change one’s religion. The Quran is explicit on it.”129
Article 18 survived these challenges and made it into the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The critique from some ecumenical quarters led by Max Huber that the JCRL-led
international human rights project had blunted some of the Christian personalist elements for the
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sake of broad appeal remained. Yet, the adoption of Article 18 was widely acclaimed as a
triumph. The success of the religious liberty campaign was, without doubt, a highpoint of
twentieth-century ecumenism. In two years, Article 18 would find its way into the European
Convention on Human Rights.130 The CCIA would then embark on a successful campaign to
domesticate the international legal provision into national constitutions, devoting particular
attention to Muslim lands.131 Wielding Article 18, mission-minded ecumenists would dismantle
barriers to accessing the mission field. As they did so, they congratulated themselves on their
feat: no longer would secularism, especially that expressed as unchristian separation, curb
missionary proselytization while advancing false faiths.

III. A Nation “Divided by God”132
Although the globalization of Article 18 did not manifest directly in U.S. law as it did elsewhere,
neither did the ecumenical project depart the United States with the ecumenists following the
Article 18 negotiations in San Francisco Article 18. In fact, clear, if sometimes delicate, links
connect the US debates and the earlier twentieth-century global ecumenical story. Most
immediately, the rift within the global ecumenical movement between JCRL elites Otto
Frederick Nolde and John Foster Dulles, and ecumenists like Max Huber, came to manifest as a
crack within U.S. Protestantism. That intra-Protestant divide would come to shape the course of
U.S. struggles over religion state relations. Manifesting in the U.S. as a debate over the proper
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attitude of Protestants to the exclusion of Protestant exercises in schools, the rift was, at its core,
a reenactment of the Dulles-Huber disagreement over whether the Protestant project ought to be
translated in broad, general terms. In the U.S., the disagreement would not lead to the triumph of
the Dulles-Noldeian position as occurred on the international plane. Rather, the split would
culminate in the exodus of Evangelicals evincing the Huberian view, and following that, the
alliance of these Evangelicals with Catholics in the 1970s. These U.S. “religious antiliberals”133
(as the Evangelical-Catholic coalition come to be known) inherited the legal arguments of their
ecumenical forbears—the critique of secularism as an unchristian separation, and the
neutralization of the unchristian separation through a Christian preferentialist notion of religious
liberty. At the same time, however, in opposing the mainline Protestant position, these religious
antiliberals paradoxically branded their international ecumenical forbears who invented the
arguments as opponents. U.S. constitutional discourse would therefore come to feature both
striking continuities as well as marked reversals from the earlier ecumenical debate.

A. Debating Translation: An Afterlife of Article 18
As I have shown in Part II, the triumph of the American-led effort to enshrine an
international notion of religious liberty was overshadowed by accusations that it had been at the
cost of de-Christianizing the global ecumenical vision. Dulles, Nolde, and other JCRL elites
were not the only ecumenists subject to this critique. The disagreement was laid bare when the
incipient World Council of Churches convened at the Beau Séjour hotel in Geneva in 1939 to
deliberate on stopping the imminent war. The discussion featured not only laypersons like Dulles
and Huber, but also theologians such as Emil Brunner. Building on Brunner’s idea of “minimum
133
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morality” for all peoples, Christians, and non-Christians, Dulles made a case for state protection
of “the dignity and worth of individual persons.”134 Although Dulles was clear that the ultimate
aim of such a project would be to indirectly infuse Christian ideals into public life and
international affairs in furtherance of the ecumenical cause, this plan went beyond the missionary
“religious liberty” campaign. Dulles’ proposal received the support of the majority of the Beau
Séjour ecumenists, and the gathering agreed on the value of espousing “rights” principles as a
“moral” rather than a “faith” matter. The ecumenists proclaimed in the Beau Séjour report:
“While it is our Christian faith which urges us to adhere to these principles, they are of such a
character that many who do not profess the Christian faith but are equally bewildered by the
openly proclaimed moral anarchy, will respond with cordial assent.”135
One scholar argues that “the political inscription of theological personhood blunted the
anti-secular polemic that produced the concept of personhood in the first place.”136 This was
precisely the impression of Max Huber. Arriving days late into the conference, Huber was
consternated by the direction of the proceedings. The duty of the church, Huber argued, was not
to “win assent” from non-Christians. Its obligation is “to say to the world a specifically Christian
word.”137 His brethren, Huber argued, had failed in doing so and had instead issued a report, of
which “Two-thirds … could have been said as well by any well-intentioned non-Christian
people.” Huber concluded that the report was to that extent, “a secular message.” These
criticisms would hound Dulles’s work, including his Commission on a Just and Durable Peace.
Swedish ecumenist Nils Ehrenström would, for instance, argue that the Dulles Commission
134

PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, CHURCHES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS:
A MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAY EXPERTS AND ECUMENICAL LEADERS
CONVENED IN JULY, 1939 7 (1939)” in Reynolds, supra note 61, at 271.
135
Reynolds, supra note 61, at 274.
136
Id.
137
CHURCHES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS, supra note 134, at 36 in Reynolds, supra note 61, at 275.

38

Rabiat Akande 9.21
Forthcoming in the Journal of Law and Religion

privileged the creation of political institutions over the primary Christian goal of spreading the
gospel.138 To these Huberian ecumenists, this critique extended beyond Dulles's work, tainting
the entirety of the American Protestant-driven Article 18 effort.
The critique that Dulles and Nolde’s work “translated” Christian ideas into a “legal idiom
with broad appeal among people of goodwill” lives on in the U.S. Evangelical and
fundamentalist disagreement with liberalized Protestantism.139 Starting with the McCollum,
Engel, and Abington decisions, a rift opened within U.S. Protestantism, with Evangelicals and
Fundamentalists beginning to dissent from the mainline Protestant position. These dissenters
argued that in endorsing the exclusion of devotional exercises, mainline Protestants had
promoted “the evacuation of religion from public discourse.” Their erstwhile brethren had joined
“the fight for separation of religion from government” on the wrong side with the consequence
of “giving up their claim to provide unique moral truths … [and granting] secular liberal ideas
primacy over religion.”140 By doing so, Evangelicals argued, mainline Protestants had joined
forces with secularism.
The Supreme Court’s McCollum v. Board of Education decision, handed down on March
8, 1948 while Article 18 deliberations unfolded in San Francisco, opened this intra-Protestant
divide. The court’s invalidation of a school religious program set off a division among U.S.
Protestants most evidently within the ranks of Protestants and Other Americans United for the
Separation of Church and State (“Protestants United”). Protestants United was founded in the
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wake of the 1947 Everson decision141 to advance the “separation of church and state.”
Nevertheless, the organization did not unequivocally support separation as its mission suggested;
it sought to protect the wall of separation from being breached by a specific religionCatholicism. While Protestants United cheered on the famous Eversion pronouncement of a
“wall of separation between Church and State,” it was alarmed by the court’s declaration that
state funding (of transportation costs) for parochial schools–at the time overwhelmingly
Catholic–was constitutional. In a scathing editorial critique of the decision, the Christian
Century, a mainline Protestant publication, argued that the court’s decision was another sign of
the incremental “encroachments by the Roman Church” on the wall of separation.142 The
“ultimate purpose” of those encroachments, argued Clayton Morrison, author of the editorial and
Vice President of Protestants United, was the “elimination of the wall of separation.” Another
Christian Century piece argued that Everson was an “unconstitutional development,” pointing
out that although the Roman Catholic intrusion into the state was initially for “humanitarian”
purposes like welfare and school, the stealth process of encroachment would ultimately destroy
the wall of separation. Protestants United, therefore, sought to protect the wall from the threat of
Catholic intrusion as laid out by founding Protestants United member Paul Blanshard in his
controversial 1949 book, American Freedom and Catholic Power.
McCollum challenged Protestants United’s apparent commitment to separation. Invoking
the wall of separation and the “no aid” rationale laid down in Everson, the court held that school
released time for religious instructions, a program popular among Protestants, was
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unconstitutional.143 Ernest Johnson, a prominent member of the Federal Council of Churches and
an educator, described the irony wrought by the McCollum decision: “Up to now we have
thought of the separation of church and state as virtually synonymous with religious liberty, a
principle with which we consider ourselves closely identified historically. It has been something
of a Protestant slogan. Now we find it used to challenge one of our most distinctive enterprises.
We have regarded the separation of church and state almost as an aspect of Protestant strategy.
This is a striking irony in the turning of the tables.”144 Drawing attention to the divide between
the notion of separation espoused by McCollum and that advanced by Protestants, Johnson
declared: “Whereas our main concern from the beginning has been to defend religion against the
state, their main concern is to defend the state against religion.”, as Johnson declared that
McCollum “gored” the “ox” of Protestants by espousing the latter view of separation.145
The rift between mainline Protestants and Evangelicals following McCollum bore an
uncanny resemblance to the Dulles-Huber divide within global ecumenical discourse. The
mainline Protestant reaction to McCollum was unmistakably similar to the Dulles-Noldeian
position in international ecumenical discourse. To be sure, the support that the McCollum
decision found among the upper echelons of the Protestants United leadership wasn’t always
coherent or cohesive. A minority led by Joseph Martin Dawson, first Executive Director of the
organization, were dogged in their defense of McCollum, expressing “anger” at the charge
leveled by Evangelicals that McCollum furthered “atheism” and godlessness.”146 However, other
mainline leaders admitted that Protestants United’s agenda was at odds with the McCollum
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advancement of secularism and elimination of religion from schools. Morrison, for instance,
argued, that secularism bred “a religion of its own, whose gods are idols in the form of
nationalism, democracy, science, humanism.” 147 Despite this acknowledgment of the danger of
the secularism espoused by McCollum, these mainline Protestants argued that the protection of
protestant liberty from Catholic excesses had to be made on principled grounds. Such a
principled opposition called for translating the protestant agenda into broad general terms of
state-religion separation, allying with secularists, and putting up with a decision like McCollum.
This stance of mainline Protestants in the US debates was an unmistakable re-enactment of the
Dulles-Noldeian position in the global ecumenical context.
Evangelicals dissented from the mainline Protestant position to become the staunchest
critics of McCollum—alongside Catholics. But Evangelicals were hardly the sole Protestant
dissenters; notably, the Lutheran theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, joined Evangelicals in mounting
a critique of the support McCollum found in the leadership of Protestants United and the
mainline Protestant movement. In words reminiscent of his fiery address at Oxford in 1937,
Niebuhr charged that the court’s “misleading metaphor of separation” would “accelerate the
trend toward secularization.”148 Although Niebuhr’s global ecumenical presence did not extend
to religious liberty efforts as Huber’s had, the former joined Evangelicals in mounting a
Huberian critique on mainline protestant support for McCollum. Evangelical dissenters and
Niebuhr blamed “the unnatural alliance between churchmen and extreme secularists” for the
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decision. Therefore, to assent to McCollum was, in the opinion of this group, to give in to
secularism. Not even the mission to curtail Catholic influence was worth such a cost.149
The rift would only widen in the years following McCollum. In 1962, the Supreme Court
held in Engel v. Vitale150 that school prayers violated the Establishment Clause, delivering a loss
to Evangelicals. To the Evangelical movement, Engel, which was reaffirmed the following year
in Abington v. Schempp,151 was about far more than school devotional exercises; it was about the
role of religion in public life. Specifically, Evangelicals regarded the Engel and Schempp
decisions as the expression of a secular humanistic idea that sought to relegate religion to the
private sphere.
Most Protestant groups, including Baptist and Presbyterians and organizations such as
Protestants United and the National Council of Churches, endorsed Engel and Schempp.152
Christianity Today, a conservative periodical, argued that the Court’s decision in Engel was
“compatible both with a proper Christian attitude toward government stipulation of religious
exercises and with a sound philosophical view of freedom.”153 Moreover, thirty-one Protestant
leaders, including Methodist Bishops, the President of the Southern Baptist Convention, and a
former President of the NCC signed a statement, lauding the decision for protecting: “the
integrity of the religious conscience and the proper function of religious and governmental
institutions.” Amid this torrent of Protestant support for a decision that already had the backing
149
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of prominent Jewish groups, the dissenting groups held out. While Niebuhr had reversed his
view to now support the mainline position,154 fundamentalist Protestants and Evangelicals were
steadfast in their opposition.155 The National Association of Evangelicals not only refused to sign
on to the broad support that greeted Engel and Schempp, it also stringently criticized the
decisions as a manifestation of the decreasing significance of religion in public life. Secular
humanism, Evangelicals argued, was taking over state and society.156
Three landmark decisions cemented the Evangelical exodus from the mainline Protestant
position and inspired its alliance with Catholics. The first was the court’s desegregation decision
in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, which was followed by the rise of Christian academies.
If the Engel and Schempp de-Protestantization of schools was what Evangelicals opposed, the
funding of Christian, white academies, which had first exploded following the Brown decision,
was what they began to seek. Encapsulating this nexus between the race question and the
contestation over religion in the domain of schools, a Congressman representing Alabama fumed
in reaction to Engel: “They put the Negroes in the schools and now they’re driving God out.”157
In securing public funding for these emerging Christian educational institutions and eschewing
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“secularism,” Evangelicals found common ground with Catholics–a group that had long operated
parochial schools and sought government funding.158
The other two landmark decisions that triggered the Evangelical exodus from the
mainline Protestant position and catalyzed its embrace of Catholics were the 1965 Griswold v.
Connecticut159 decision and the 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade.160 Following Griswold’s
liberalization of access to contraceptives, the Evangelical perception that religion was being
banished from the public square only intensified.161 Hostilities only peaked following Roe.
Responding to Roe, the National Association of Evangelicals declared: “We deplore, in the
strongest possible terms, the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court which has made it legal to
terminate a pregnancy for no better reason than personal convenience or sociological
considerations.”162 Even Christianity Today, which had declared the mainline Protestant support
for Engel and Schempp, ran an editorial pronouncing that “the decision runs counter not merely
to the moral teachings of Christianity through the ages but also to the moral sense of the
American people.”163
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It was the genius of crafting opposition to abortion as a moral and a Christian, rather than
a merely Protestant issue, that inspired the alliance between Evangelicals and Catholics.164 To be
sure, Catholics were publicly vocal about their abortion stance long before Evangelicals. As the
Reverend Jerry Falwell pointed out in 1979: “The Roman Catholic Church for many years has
stood virtually alone against abortion. I think it’s an indictment against the rest of us that we’ve
allowed them to stand alone.”165 Nevertheless, Evangelicals took a stance once Roe was handed
down, setting aside their age-long animus against Catholics to ally against a new enemy: “secular
humanism.” “To understand secular humanism,” Christian Harvest Times, a Christian magazine,
declared in its July 1980 edition, “is to understand women’s liberation, the ERA, gay rights,
children’s rights, abortion, sex education, . . . the separation of church and state, the loss of
patriotism, and many of the other problems that are tearing America apart today.”166
The new Christian coalition was clear that the problem was not merely secular
humanism; it was the expression that secular humanism had found in the law. As Canadian-born
Lutheran conservative (later turned Roman Catholic), Father Richard John Neuhaus, argued in
his influential work, The Naked Public Square, the major challenge to religion lay in the
secularist legal campaign to expunge religion from the public sphere. As Neuhaus set it out, the
task was to “disrupt the business of secular America by an appeal to religiously based public
values.”167 What was striking about the U.S. discourse was that mainline Protestants came to be
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regarded as part of this “secular America.” Strikingly reminiscent of the Huberian critique of the
mainline global ecumenical position, Evangelicals regarded the mainline protestant alliance with
secularists starting from the McCollum moment as unholy. Moreover, these critics understood
the alliance as a move from Christianity to a belief in the false deity of secularism. To neutralize
this secularist enemy, the Evangelical-Catholic coalition began to deploy claims of a Christian
preferentialist notion of religious liberty. The unending tussle between Christian preferentialism
and legal secularism thus began.
Today, Protestants United has unwittingly lived up to the Evangelical critique. Now
known as Americans United, today’s Protestants United is a coalition of multi-religious and nonreligious interests and champions a strict separationist agenda. On the other hand, contemporary
“religious antiliberals” are today’s vanguards of the Evangelical-Catholic project. If these are
distant renditions of the global Dulles-Noldeian v. Huberian debates, they are hardly
recognizable.

B. Contesting Unchristian Separation
As was the case with early to mid-twentieth century global ecumenists, U.S. “religious
antiliberals” do not regard secularism as a neutral separation of the state and religion; instead,
they consider secularism as the state’s separation from Christianity. These “values
Evangelicals,”168 as U.S. “religious antiliberals” are also known, do not imagine the secularist
enemy to be devoid of values. Secularism, in the religious antiliberal discourse, is unchristian—a
false faith. Conservative scholar Steven Smith’s arresting work, Pagans and Christians in the
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City, sets out this idea in stark terms.169 Drawing from T.S. Eliot’s prediction of a battle between
Christianity and paganism,170 Smith argues that the contemporary culture wars fulfill Eliot’s
thesis. Smith, moreover, argues that the tussle is not new; it is reminiscent of the struggle
between early Christians and pagans in the Roman empire.
“The Idea of a Christian Society,” the T.S Eliot work that inspired Smith, espoused the
vision of the Christian state sought by global ecumenists. As I noted earlier, the ecumenical
campaign to make headway in the non-Christian world focuses on overcoming religion-state
separations that were unfriendly to Christianity. The 1945 JCRL report, Religious Liberty,
declared the ultimate Christian goal as the constitutional structure of “friendly separations.”
Finding the foremost examples of such friendly separations in the United Kingdom’s affinity
with the Church of England and the special status of Christianity in the U.S., the report argued
that such arrangements are based on voluntary cooperation between the Church and State. The
Bates-authored report concluded that only such an arrangement would permit the triumph of the
“free religion.”171 Only one form of Christian establishment worried ecumenists—the Spanish
fascist variety that threatened the freedom of the church. Ecumenists therefore favored the
entanglement of church and state.
This ecumenical attitude reflected ecumenical advocacy in colonial territories, as well.
Peter Van der Veer’s work on India shows that the missionary campaign for the empire’s
separation from indigenous religions was not a manifestation of a commitment to separation.
Instead, it was the last resort of activists who preferred an alliance with the state but were willing
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to settle for the state’s separation from its rival if that was the only option available.172 In Muslim
West Africa, the origins of colonial rule lay in empire-missionary ties.173 As Evangelical Thomas
Foxwell Buxton, the brains behind the African Colonization expedition, envisioned, Christianity
was to drive both the ‘civilizational’ and ‘economic’ aspirations of the empire. The preference
for Christianized states and a Christianized world, in sum, motivated ecumenists.
Regardless of the wall of separation metaphor that has come to be associated with the
Establishment Clause in the U.S., scholars argue that the clause was not originally intended to
separate the state from religion.174 Not only did several states have established churches at the
adoption of the first amendment, but many also promoted Protestantism through various devices.
Of the fourteen states in existence at the making of the Establishment Clause, seven maintained
and sponsored a state church, and several others advanced denominations of Protestantism in
various ways. Even the much-touted beacon of religious liberty, Rhode Island, excluded
Catholics and Jews, as such, from citizenship.175 As Jeffries and Ryan point out, a “Protestant
establishment dominated public life,” even if that establishment was “unselfconscious.” 176 Given
this de facto Protestant establishment, Protestants generally saw no disconnect between Christian
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free exercise and the Establishment Clause.177 Protestants vigorously deployed church-state
separation arguments in furtherance of anti-Catholic animus in the decades preceding the
Evangelical-Catholic alliance. Declaring its stance on the religion-state separation, the National
Association of Evangelicals, for instance, argued that it favored “strict separation of church and
state especially as the state might interrelate with Roman Catholic Church.”178 The critique of
unchristian secularist separation would replace the ostensibly unequivocal Evangelical
commitment to separation. The shift, as I argue above, was driven by the common interest
Evangelicals and Catholics found in the public funding of parochial schools following the rise of
Christian academies in the aftermath of Brown, Engel, and Schempp and by intensified fears of a
purge of Christian values from public life following Griswold and Roe.
Paradoxically, the decline in Evangelical support for church-state separation was justified
by the idea of church-state separation itself. As Ernest Johnson argued in the aftermath of
McCollum, church-state separation was a constitutional arrangement that could be secularist or
Christian. Secularist separation sought to “defend the state against religion” and was therefore
unchristian. Another form of separation was praiseworthy: that which sought to protect religion
against the state. This form of separation, reminiscent of the “friendly separations” championed
by Milner Bates on the global ecumenical scene, was what the Christian coalition advocated.
This critique of secularist separation and simultaneous embrace of “friendly separations”
finds expression in the contemporary discourse of former Attorney General Barr. On the one
hand, the Barrian position advocates an interpretation of the establishment clause that dissolves
the wall of separation when it benefits the church and invokes “non-interference” to erect the
177
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wall when expedient. Reflecting its favor for this project, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
government funding of parochial schools now regards the disqualification of religious schools
from state funding as unconstitutional.179 Free exercise, in essence, trumps separationist concerns
in the arena of parochial schools’ funding. However, this has not translated into a blanket
hostility to separation; like global ecumenists, contemporary Barrians have not hesitated to
deploy separationist notions to advance the interests of the Christian coalition. A notable
example has been in the doctrine of ministerial exemptions, where the coalition has successfully
promoted the legal principle exempting internal governance questions of religious organizations
from government interference. Our Lady of Guadalupe v. Morrissey-Berru,180 involving an antidiscrimination claim by two elementary school teachers against their Roman-Catholic
employers, is a recent expression of the favor this campaign has found with the Supreme
Court.181 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito held that the First Amendment prohibits
“intrusion” into “matters of church government.” Deciding the question brought by the Plaintiffs
would, Alito concluded, “risk judicial entanglement in religious issues.”182 This was despite the
fact that the entanglement test had, since Lemon v. Kurtzman, been deployed in furtherance of
the secularist separation abhorred by the Christian coalition.183 Church-state separation was, in
its Guadalupe rendition, on the side of the church. This deployment of separation for the ends of
179
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the church has been made possible by the emergence of a notion of religious liberty staunch in its
faithfulness to the Christian project, a point I turn to below.

C. The Two Faces of Liberty
The global ecumenical religious liberty campaign was expressly premised on the argument that
Christians were a religious minority in the colonies. As I noted earlier, once ecumenists failed to
secure an alliance with the state and turned to religious liberty to contest the state’s false faith,
they began to invoke the political and religious minority status of Christians as a justification for
special protections. This argument was put to good use in deliberations over Article 18. To take
a case in point: when making a case for Nigeria’s domestication of Article 18, Sir Kenneth
Grubb, Chair of the Commission for the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), argued that
the provision was a guarantee intended to protect Christians and animists–the target of much of
missionary proselytization–from the Muslim majority. Ecumenical justifications for the need for
Article 18 not only sidelined the horror of the Holocaust184 it also left out Muslim and nonMuslim minority groups facing severe persecution in the Muslim African territories with which
ecumenists were concerned.185 Grubb’s assertions also obscured the clout of missions and
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Christian converts in the colony. Although missions never returned to the dominion they enjoyed
at the height of their nineteenth-century alliance with the empire; they continued to command
varying degrees of influence within the colonial administration. This influence would produce
significant policy victories, especially in the years leading to decolonization—a period during
which the postcolonial state’s constitution was designed with the active involvement of
missions.186
It is not uncommon to now hear declarations that the U.S. Christian coalition is a
religious minority identity. Not merely an assertion, this identity has proved useful in securing
legal victories. The legal strategy sprang from the recognition that Supreme Court jurisprudence
on free exercise developed in the context of the protection of religious minorities. The star of that
story was eminent conservative scholar Michael W. McConnell, and the case was Rosenberger v.
Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia.187 In Rosenberger, UVA denied a student
application for monies intended to fund an Evangelical magazine, Wide Awake. The source of the
funding sought was the students-activities fund, which was collected from mandatory student
contributions. UVA’s decision to deny the funding request was based on an establishment
clause-inspired policy prohibiting funding religious purposes. Represented by Professor
McConnell, the Plaintiff argued that UVA’s decision infringed on the Establishment Clause
because it amounted to viewpoint discrimination. This was a novel argument. As Noah Feldman
tells the story, McConnell’s genius lay in instrumentalizing the sympathy that both the Supreme
Court and groups who favored secularist separation tended to express in free exercise cases
involving minorities.188 This was, however, not a free exercise case, and that sympathy had to be
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transposed to the context of the Establishment Clause context. On the way from free exercise to
the Establishment Clause, McConnell branched off at free speech doctrine, extrapolating the
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination in that context. The court agreed with McConnell,
holding that funding Wide Awake would not amount to an Establishment Clause violation; to
deny the publication funding from a generally available student fund amounted to discriminating
against the viewpoint espoused by the publication.189
Legal arguments springing from the premise that the Christian coalition is a religious
minority remain alive today, finding renewed expression on the Court. Dissenting in Obergefell,
Justice Alito predicted that the decision would be used to “vilify Americans who are unwilling to
assent to the new orthodoxy.”190 Speaking at a Catholic Lawyer’s Association event two years
later in March 2017, Justice Alito would declare: “We are seeing this coming to pass. A wind is
picking that is hostile to those with traditional moral beliefs.”191 Barr was, therefore, not without
precedent when he spoke in his 2019 Notre Dame speech of religious persecution. “Those who
defy the creed” of secularism, Barr warned, “risk a figurative burning at the stake – social,
educational, and professional ostracism and exclusion waged through lawsuits and savage social
media.”192 The Court would appear to agree. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court held that
Colorado’s Civil Rights Commissioners’ disparaging remarks about the petitioner’s religious
objections to same-sex weddings evinced a hostility that tainted the commission’s proceedings.
The hostility, the Court concluded, amounted to religious viewpoint discrimination and infringed
on the petitioner’s free exercise rights.
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At the same time, however, the Court declined to uphold the same standard less than
three weeks later in considering the constitutionality of the Presidential Proclamation banning
travel to the U.S. from several Muslim majority states in Trump v. Hawaii.193 Remarkably, the
Christian coalition took no stance on the outcome of Hawaii. Although the Christian Legal
Society and the National Association of Evangelicals filed an amicus brief arguing that the
Establishment Clause prohibited intentional discrimination among religions, the brief was
limited to the legal principle—which undoubtedly advanced the position of the Christian
coalition.194 Unlike a wide range of religious groups who filed briefs in opposition to the travel
ban, several of whom also actively supported the legal separation of church and state, the
Christian coalition took no stance on the outcome of the case.195
In a dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor juxtaposed the Court’s
Hawaii decision with its stance in Masterpiece Cakeshop, pointing out that both cases raised the
question “whether a government actor exhibited tolerance and neutrality.” In Masterpiece,
Sotomayor argued, the Court had considered officials’ hostile “statements about religion” to be
“persuasive evidence of unconstitutional government action” amounting to a violation of the
“neutrality” required by the Free Exercise Clause. However, in Hawaii, the majority “completely
sets aside the President’s charged statements about Muslims as irrelevant.” This double standard,
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the dissent charged, “tells members of minority religions in our country that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community.”196 The Sotomayor dissent, in sum, pointed out the
court’s Christian preferentialism. Far from new, this Christian preferentialist bent in the court’s
jurisprudence perpetuates the view, at least since Justice Brewer’s well-known 1892 declaration
in Holy Trinity,197 that the U.S. “is a Christian nation.”198 Neither is U.S. Christian
preferentialism a distinctly national phenomenon; regardless of the peculiarities of its U.S.
manifestation, the global ecumenical “religious liberty” project lives on in the arguments for U.S.
Christian preferentialism.
Conclusion
The global ecumenical struggle reached a climax with the triumph of Article 18 in 1948, but the
afterlife of that project continues to reverberate. Indeed, the ecumenical arguments that brought
forth Article 18 continue to serve as a resource for contemporary U.S. religious antiliberals
contesting “secularism.” When Barr decries the “organized destruction” being unleashed on
religion by “militant secularism” and charges co-religionists to “resist” “the war being waged on
religion,”199 the former Attorney General finds precedent in the intellectual tradition of his global
ecumenical forbears. The U.S. is not alone. Across the Atlantic, Europe is witnessing similar
confrontations even if those are not always animated by the anxieties that plague the U.S.
Concurring in the European Court of Human Rights Lautsi v. Italy decision endorsing the display
of crucifixes in classrooms, for instance, Justice Bonello articulated the European counterpart of
the Barrian campaign through a reference to the domesticated equivalent of Article 18 in the
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European Convention.200 “Freedom of religion,” Bonello argued, “is not secularism. Freedom of
religion is not the separation of Church and State ... In Europe, secularism is optional, freedom
of religion is not.”201 The European struggles only resonate more deeply when one compares the
Lautsi decision with the European Court’s deployment of secularism (“interdenominational
neutrality”) to proscribe a Muslim public school teacher from wearing a headscarf in an earlier
case.202 This article recovers the longer global genealogy of this contemporary manifestation of
religious antiliberalism.
This genealogical account unmasks the instability of the ideas of “secularism,” and
“religious liberty.” As I show, the campaign for a Christian-friendly “religious liberty” was not
imagined to be a clash with a hollow religion-state separation constitutional structure; global
ecumenists conceived of state separation from Christianity as a turn to false faiths. Secularism
was therefore a competing religion, manifesting as Islam in British Muslim Africa and later, as
communism and German national socialism in Europe. In the same way, US religious
antiliberals regard secularism as a false orthodoxy and respond by advancing a notion of
religious liberty that centers on the Christian experience. By unveiling the emergence of
Christian preferentialism in specific response to an unfriendly secularism in both the early global
ecumenical campaign and in the current U.S. project, I question the faithfulness of the
commitment to religious liberty, and of a principled aversion to a secularism.
In the end, however, the crux of this narrative is not merely to highlight the disconnect
between the idealized notions of secularism and religious liberty and the expression they find in
particular struggles. Instead, it is to reveal the impossibility of understanding these ideas outside
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of the context of specific encounters. It is in these encounters that the political conditions that
galvanize these ideas and the changing relations that inspire their transformations are unveiled.
Only with that discovery, I conclude, can one hope to begin to grasp the complexity of law’s
relationship with faith and power.
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